From the book

The argument I shall present in the next chapter provides what I believe to be a very clear-cut argument for a non-computational ingredient in our conscious thinking. This depends upon a simple form of the famous and powerful theorem of mathematical logic, due to the great Czech-born logician Kurt Godel. I shall need only a very simplified form of this argument, requiring only very little mathematics (where I also borrow from an important later idea due to Alan Turing). Any reasonably dedicated reader should find no great difficulty in following it. However Godel-type arguments, used in this kind of way, have sometimes been vigorously disputed. Consequently, some readers might have gained an impression that this argument from Godel’s theorem has been fully refuted. I should make it clear that this is not so. It is true that many counter-arguments have been put forward over the years. Many of these were aimed at a pioneering earlier argument – in favour of mentalism and opposed to physicalism – that had been advanced by the Oxford philosopher John Lucas (1961). Lucas had argued from the Godel theorem that mental faculties must indeed lie beyond what can be achieved computationally. (others, such as Nagel and Newmann (1958), had previously argued in a similar vein.) My own argument, though following similar lines, is presented somewhat differently from that of Lucas – and not necessarily as support for mentalism. I believe that my form of presentation is better able to withstand the different criticisms that have been raised against the Lucas argument, and to show up their various inadequacies.

>Now I may need to get Penrose’s book…
For your information, the first part of the book is a detailed presentaion of this argument considering a number of objections that may be raised. The second part contains a description of the physical structure of the brain (that goes way beyond simple networks of neurons), a brief introduction to current physical theory and an outline of where it may be modified to incorporate a non-computational aspect.
Throughout the book, Penrose seems to be a Platonist. But he is not really one. He ends the book with

These are deep issues and we are yet very far from explanations. I would argue that no clear answers will come forward unless the interrelating features of all these worlds are seen to come into play. no one of these issues will be resolved in isolation from the others. I have referred to three worlds [Platonic world, Physical world and Mental world] and the mysteries that relate them one to another. No doubt, there are not really three worlds but one, the true nature of which we do not even glimpse at present.

Overall, the book is definitely worth reading.

I can surely visualise an isolated tape recorder which is making statements about itself, some of which are in accordance with reality, and some of which are not. The former ones I call true statements, and the latter false.

I guess the issue is whether the truth label is an inherent property of the statement or if it’s something each observer/listener assigns to it. You seem to suggest the latter, and imply that a deterministic observers’ label assignment would have no meaning/significance.

Anyways, I will read the books you mentioned (assuming I have free will )

The fact that I cannot accept determinism does not mean that I haven’t struggled with the issue. But the root of the struggle lies in the seeming conflict between volition and causality. It is a scientific puzzle and not a doubt about whether I really have volition or not. All current scientific knowledge seems to say that volition is not possible. But that does not mean we can reject volition. That would be twisting fact to suit existing theory. We need to find new theories that can account for volition.

You should read “The Emporer’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind” by Roger Penrose. The first book attempts a refutation of artificial intelligence. The second book completes it by mathematically demonstrating that human understanding is not algorithmic – it is qualitatively different from anything a Universal Turing Machine can do. Penrose uses a variant of Godel’s incompleteness proof to demonstrate this. In the second half of the book, Penrose argues that we need a new breakthrough in physics to understand the working of the human mind. I read it about an year back but haven’t yet been able to digest all of it.

Although Penrose does not directly address the question of free will, concepts as basic as truth are meaningless without free will. Consider a tape recorder reciting some statement. Is the statement true? The truth of the statement depends on the existence of an entity which can understand the meaning of the statement. Suppose the statement is in Chinese. And I am hearing it. To me the statement is neither true nor false. In fact it is not a statement at all until I can figure out which language the statement is in. Truth is inseparable from meaning. A word (or statement) has meaning when it describes some existent. But in a purely deterministic or random world, nothing could be said to describe anything else. Would you say that an effect describes a cause or vice versa? Or that an effect describes another effect?

Can you do without the concept of truth? Obviously not. If you rejected the concept of truth you wouldn’t even be able to ask “Is the doctrine that humans have free-will true?” But truth depends on free will. As I wrote above in a purely deterministic world, this question has no meaning. Since I already have a number of concepts that I cannot reject all of which depend on the existence of free – will, I induce the existence of free – will from them.

I agree that the free will/determinism issue cannot be resolved just from inferences from observations of the universe. We will have to appeal to some basic principle to resolve this. The principle you appeal to is

“We have free will.”

This is all fine and good. But isn’t it begging the question? I mean the principle here is so specific to this issue. Won’t a more basic principle which leads to the same conclusion be more attractive and desirable ? I am not sure if this can be done.

My (current) position is that there is only one fundamental continuous choice – the choice to focus one’s mind or not ranging from full focus to no focus. At any given instant when I am conscious, I can choose to focus or not. If I do choose to focus, my conscious mind thinks about anything that happens to be the object(s) of my focus. The object(s) of my focus are determined by sensory inputs and memories and I do not have conscious control over these objects. That is, I cannot choose to selectively ignore sensory input or my memories. I can only “globally” control the processing of that input.

I don’t think my position is circular either (the one line statement of my position was definitely circular).

The problem with Mises’s position is that it ignores – actually rejects – the introspective knowledge I have of my choice to focus. I know introspectively that I can choose to focus or not. For example, I choose to unfocus when I am trying to sleep. Or I can choose to remain focussed to stay awake even if I am tired. A denial of this choice – calling it an illusion – is unacceptable to me. If I do not accept the validity of introspection, I cannot accept the validity of anything at all. And that is a contradiction.

As I understand it, “knowledge”, “understanding” etc are all conditional on the concept of free will. Free will to me seems to be the only reason I distinguish between a computer and my mind. If I were to accept determinism, I would have to reject / modify a number of very basic concepts – choice, action, individuality, responsibility, consciousness, entity etc. I don’t think that is possible.

In a comment on an earlier post Burgess Laughlin provided a reference to the following article.
“Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation” in “Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1991)” by Harry Binswanger. I suppose you would be able to access it online through your univ account.

As for resolving the controversy, I don’t think there is much to resolve philosophically. You can never convince a determinist of the existence of free will based on deductive logical arguments and external evidence. His position implies that any such attempts including his acceptance or rejection of those attempts is also determined. There is nothing you can say to that. Deductive logic has limited utility after all.
Similarly, no one can ever convince me that free will does not exist because I know introspectively without any deductions that I do choose to focus or not. What needs to be resolved (not sure if it is possible to do so) is the physics of the working of the mind, ideas, memories, consciousness etc.

“The choices a man makes are determined by the ideas he adopts provided he chooses to think.”

Aren’t both these statements circular in nature?

I think of Mises’ statement in this way :
We are all determined by some deterministic process. The only true choice, if any, would have occurred during the first few moments after birth (the first idea adopted?). That could have been the only true random ’seed’ to an otherwise deterministic process.

Your statement has much more circular dependency (and I am not exactly sure how to parse it).

Neither of the statement seems to resolve anything about determinism/free will, don’t you agree ?

Altruism:
1 : unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfare of others
2 : behavior by an animal that is not beneficial to or may be harmful to itself but that benefits others of its species

Egoism:
1 a : a doctrine that individual self-interest is the actual motive of all conscious action
b : a doctrine that individual self-interest is the valid end of all actions
2 : excessive concern for oneself with or without exaggerated feelings of self-importance

Egoism: 1 a is probably the reason for your question. This view is actually a psychological theory and not an ethical one. It is about what is rather than what should be. It is obviously a false doctrine. There definitely are people who make genuine sacrifices i.e, choose a lower value over a higher value in order to serve the interests of someone else. There are also hedonists who act to maximize their immediate pleasure with no regard for their actual interests. The only way to make this doctrine true is to hold that any freely chosen action is in one’s self-interest. That makes ‘interest’ an empty and useless concept. Interest is properly defined with respect to the actual (based on reality) requirements of man’s life. Not all men even take the trouble to discover what their ‘interests’ actually are.

Egoism: 2 is a useless definition as there is no standard mentioned for what is excessive.

I adopt Egoism: 1 a as the proper definition. Comparing with altruism and rephrasing it,
Egoism is the doctrine that the actor is the proper beneficiary of his actions.
Altruism is the doctrine that the proper beneficiary of actions is others.
Clearly then, altruism is not a form of egoism but a rejection of egoism.

I would recommend reading The Objectivist Ethics by Ayn Rand to understand what egoism (as a moral theory) is about.